org.mpisws.p2p.transport.peerreview
Interface PeerReview<Handle extends RawSerializable,Identifier extends RawSerializable>

All Superinterfaces:

CertificateManager<Handle,Identifier>, Destructable, HashProvider, IdentityTransport<Handle,Identifier>, IdentityTransportCallback<Handle,Identifier>, PeerReviewConstants, StatusConstants, TransportLayer<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer>, TransportLayerCallback<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer>

All Known Implementing Classes:

PeerReviewImpl

public interface PeerReview<Handle extends RawSerializable,Identifier extends RawSerializable>
extends IdentityTransportCallback<Handle,Identifier>, PeerReviewConstants, IdentityTransport<Handle,Identifier>

Field Summary

static java.lang.String	DONT_COMMIT -> Boolean, tell peer review to not bother committing this message.
static byte	PEER_REVIEW_COMMIT
static byte	PEER_REVIEW_PASSTHROUGH
static java.lang.String	RELEVANT_LENGTH Option should map to an int < 255 to record the relevant length of the message.

Fields inherited from interface org.mpisws.p2p.transport.peerreview.PeerReviewConstants

AUTH_CACHE_INTERVAL, CERT_MISSING, CHAL_AUDIT, CHAL_SEND, DEFAULT_AUDIT_INTERVAL_MILLIS, DEFAULT_AUTH_PUSH_INTERVAL_MILLIS, DEFAULT_CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL_MILLIS, DEFAULT_LOG_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT, DEFAULT_TIME_TOLERANCE_MILLIS, EVT_ACK, EVT_CHECKPOINT, EVT_CHOOSE_Q, EVT_CHOOSE_RAND, EVT_INIT, EVT_MAX_RESERVED, EVT_MAX_SOCKET_EVT, EVT_MIN_SOCKET_EVT, EVT_RECV, EVT_SEND, EVT_SENDSIGN, EVT_SIGN, EVT_SOCKET_CAN_READ, EVT_SOCKET_CAN_RW, EVT_SOCKET_CAN_WRITE, EVT_SOCKET_CLOSE, EVT_SOCKET_CLOSED, EVT_SOCKET_EXCEPTION, EVT_SOCKET_OPEN_INCOMING, EVT_SOCKET_OPEN_OUTGOING, EVT_SOCKET_OPENED_OUTGOING, EVT_SOCKET_READ, EVT_SOCKET_SHUTDOWN_OUTPUT, EVT_SOCKET_WRITE, EVT_VRF, EX_TYPE_ClosedChannel, EX_TYPE_IO, EX_TYPE_Unknown, FLAG_FULL_MESSAGES_ALL, FLAG_FULL_MESSAGES_SENDER, FLAG_INCLUDE_CHECKPOINT, INVALID, INVESTIGATION_INTERVAL_MILLIS, MAINTENANCE_INTERVAL_MILLIS, MAX_ACTIVE_AUDITS, MAX_ACTIVE_INVESTIGATIONS, MAX_ENTRIES_BETWEEN_CHECKPOINTS, MAX_STATUS_INFO, MAX_WITNESSED_NODES, MSG_ACCUSATION, MSG_ACK, MSG_AUTHPUSH, MSG_AUTHREQ, MSG_AUTHRESP, MSG_CHALLENGE, MSG_RESPONSE, MSG_USERDATA, MSG_USERDGRAM, NO_CERTIFICATE, PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MILLIS, PROOF_INCONSISTENT, PROOF_NONCONFORMANT, RESP_AUDIT, RESP_SEND, SIGNATURE_BAD, SIGNATURE_OK, STATE_SEND_AUDIT, STATE_WAIT_FOR_LOG, TI_AUTH_PUSH, TI_CHECKPOINT, TI_MAINTENANCE, TI_MAKE_PROGRESS, TI_MAX_RESERVED, TI_START_AUDITS, TI_STATUS_INFO, VALID

Fields inherited from interface org.mpisws.p2p.transport.peerreview.StatusConstants

STATUS_EXPOSED, STATUS_SUSPECTED, STATUS_TRUSTED

Method Summary

boolean	addAuthenticatorIfValid(AuthenticatorStore<Identifier> store, Identifier subject, Authenticator auth)
void	challengeSuspectedNode(Handle h)
Authenticator	extractAuthenticator(Identifier id, long seq, short entryType, byte[] entryHash, byte[] hTopMinusOne, byte[] signature)
Authenticator	extractAuthenticator(long seq, short entryType, byte[] entryHash, byte[] hTopMinusOne, byte[] signature)
PeerReviewCallback<Handle,Identifier>	getApp()
AuthenticatorSerializer	getAuthenticatorSerializer()
Environment	getEnvironment()
long	getEvidenceSeq()
EvidenceTool<Handle,Identifier>	getEvidenceTool()
Serializer<Handle>	getHandleSerializer()
int	getHashSizeInBytes()
SecureHistory	getHistory()
SecureHistoryFactory	getHistoryFactory()
IdentifierExtractor<Handle,Identifier>	getIdentifierExtractor()
Serializer<Identifier>	getIdSerializer()
Handle	getLocalHandle()
Identifier	getLocalId()
RandomSource	getRandomSource()
int	getSignatureSizeInBytes()
long	getTime() Current time in millis, however, we depend on there being a timesource that is more discritized than the "wall" clock.
long	getTimeToleranceMillis()
VerifierFactory<Handle,Identifier>	getVerifierFactory()
boolean	hasCertificate(Identifier id)
void	init(java.lang.String dirname)
Cancellable	requestCertificate(Handle source, Identifier certHolder)
void	sendEvidence(Handle destination, Identifier evidenceAgainst)
void	sendEvidenceToWitnesses(Identifier subject, long timestamp, Evidence evidence)
void	setApp(PeerReviewCallback<Handle,Identifier> callback)
void	transmit(Handle dest, PeerReviewMessage message, MessageCallback<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer> deliverAckToMe, java.util.Map<java.lang.String,java.lang.Object> options)
boolean	verify(Identifier subject, Authenticator auth) Throws exception if called w/o the cert for the subject

Methods inherited from interface org.mpisws.p2p.transport.peerreview.identity.IdentityTransportCallback

notifyCertificateAvailable

Methods inherited from interface org.mpisws.p2p.transport.TransportLayerCallback

incomingSocket, messageReceived

Methods inherited from interface org.mpisws.p2p.transport.peerreview.identity.CertificateManager

getSignatureSizeBytes, requestCertificate, sign, verify

Methods inherited from interface org.mpisws.p2p.transport.TransportLayer

acceptMessages, acceptSockets, getLocalIdentifier, openSocket, sendMessage, setCallback, setErrorHandler

Methods inherited from interface rice.Destructable

destroy

Methods inherited from interface org.mpisws.p2p.transport.peerreview.history.HashProvider

getEmptyHash, getHashSizeBytes, hash, hash

Field Detail

RELEVANT_LENGTH

static final java.lang.String RELEVANT_LENGTH

Option should map to an int < 255 to record the relevant length of the message.

See Also:

Constant Field Values

DONT_COMMIT

static final java.lang.String DONT_COMMIT

-> Boolean, tell peer review to not bother committing this message. Don't sign it, log it, expect an ack

See Also:

Constant Field Values

PEER_REVIEW_PASSTHROUGH

static final byte PEER_REVIEW_PASSTHROUGH

See Also:

Constant Field Values

PEER_REVIEW_COMMIT

static final byte PEER_REVIEW_COMMIT

See Also:

Constant Field Values

Method Detail

extractAuthenticator

Authenticator extractAuthenticator(Identifier id,
                                   long seq,
                                   short entryType,
                                   byte[] entryHash,
                                   byte[] hTopMinusOne,
                                   byte[] signature)

addAuthenticatorIfValid

boolean addAuthenticatorIfValid(AuthenticatorStore<Identifier> store,
                                Identifier subject,
                                Authenticator auth)

hasCertificate

boolean hasCertificate(Identifier id)

Specified by:

hasCertificate in interface CertificateManager<Handle extends RawSerializable,Identifier extends RawSerializable>

getEnvironment

Environment getEnvironment()

Specified by:

getEnvironment in interface IdentityTransport<Handle extends RawSerializable,Identifier extends RawSerializable>

getAuthenticatorSerializer

AuthenticatorSerializer getAuthenticatorSerializer()

getHandleSerializer

Serializer<Handle> getHandleSerializer()

getIdSerializer

Serializer<Identifier> getIdSerializer()

challengeSuspectedNode

void challengeSuspectedNode(Handle h)

getLocalId

Identifier getLocalId()

getLocalHandle

Handle getLocalHandle()

requestCertificate

Cancellable requestCertificate(Handle source,
                               Identifier certHolder)

extractAuthenticator

Authenticator extractAuthenticator(long seq,
                                   short entryType,
                                   byte[] entryHash,
                                   byte[] hTopMinusOne,
                                   byte[] signature)

transmit

void transmit(Handle dest,
              PeerReviewMessage message,
              MessageCallback<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer> deliverAckToMe,
              java.util.Map<java.lang.String,java.lang.Object> options)

getTime

long getTime()

Current time in millis, however, we depend on there being a timesource that is more discritized than the "wall" clock. It is only advanced on a timeout or a message receipt.

Returns:

getHashSizeInBytes

int getHashSizeInBytes()

getSignatureSizeInBytes

int getSignatureSizeInBytes()

getIdentifierExtractor

IdentifierExtractor<Handle,Identifier> getIdentifierExtractor()

getEvidenceSeq

long getEvidenceSeq()

sendEvidenceToWitnesses

void sendEvidenceToWitnesses(Identifier subject,
                             long timestamp,
                             Evidence evidence)

Parameters:

subject - the "bad" guy

timestamp -

evidence -

init

void init(java.lang.String dirname)
          throws java.io.IOException

Throws:

java.io.IOException

setApp

void setApp(PeerReviewCallback<Handle,Identifier> callback)

getApp

PeerReviewCallback<Handle,Identifier> getApp()

getEvidenceTool

EvidenceTool<Handle,Identifier> getEvidenceTool()

verify

boolean verify(Identifier subject,
               Authenticator auth)

Throws exception if called w/o the cert for the subject

Parameters:

subject -

auth -

Returns:

getRandomSource

RandomSource getRandomSource()

getHistoryFactory

SecureHistoryFactory getHistoryFactory()

getVerifierFactory

VerifierFactory<Handle,Identifier> getVerifierFactory()

getHistory

SecureHistory getHistory()

getTimeToleranceMillis

long getTimeToleranceMillis()

sendEvidence

void sendEvidence(Handle destination,
                  Identifier evidenceAgainst)