org.mpisws.p2p.transport.peerreview
Interface PeerReview<Handle extends RawSerializable,Identifier extends RawSerializable>
- All Superinterfaces:
- CertificateManager<Handle,Identifier>, Destructable, HashProvider, IdentityTransport<Handle,Identifier>, IdentityTransportCallback<Handle,Identifier>, PeerReviewConstants, TransportLayer<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer>, TransportLayerCallback<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer>
- All Known Implementing Classes:
- PeerReviewImpl
public interface PeerReview<Handle extends RawSerializable,Identifier extends RawSerializable>
- extends IdentityTransportCallback<Handle,Identifier>, IdentityTransport<Handle,Identifier>, PeerReviewConstants
Fields inherited from interface org.mpisws.p2p.transport.peerreview.PeerReviewConstants |
CHAL_AUDIT, CHAL_SEND, DEFAULT_AUTH_PUSH_INTERVAL_MICROS, DEFAULT_CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL_MICROS, DEFAULT_TIME_TOLERANCE_MICROS, EVT_ACK, EVT_CHECKPOINT, EVT_INIT, EVT_MAX_SOCKET_EVT, EVT_MIN_SOCKET_EVT, EVT_RECV, EVT_SEND, EVT_SENDSIGN, EVT_SIGN, EVT_SOCKET_CAN_READ, EVT_SOCKET_CAN_RW, EVT_SOCKET_CAN_WRITE, EVT_SOCKET_CLOSE, EVT_SOCKET_CLOSED, EVT_SOCKET_EXCEPTION, EVT_SOCKET_OPEN_INCOMING, EVT_SOCKET_OPEN_OUTGOING, EVT_SOCKET_OPENED_OUTGOING, EVT_SOCKET_READ, EVT_SOCKET_SHUTDOWN_OUTPUT, EVT_SOCKET_WRITE, EX_TYPE_ClosedChannel, EX_TYPE_IO, EX_TYPE_Unknown, MAINTENANCE_INTERVAL_MICROS, MAX_STATUS_INFO, MSG_ACCUSATION, MSG_ACK, MSG_AUTHPUSH, MSG_AUTHREQ, MSG_AUTHRESP, MSG_CHALLENGE, MSG_RESPONSE, MSG_USERDATA, MSG_USERDGRAM, PROOF_INCONSISTENT, PROOF_NONCONFORMANT, STATUS_EXPOSED, STATUS_SUSPECTED, STATUS_TRUSTED, TI_AUTH_PUSH, TI_CHECKPOINT, TI_MAINTENANCE, TI_MAX_RESERVED, TI_STATUS_INFO |
Method Summary |
boolean |
addAuthenticatorIfValid(AuthenticatorStore<Identifier> store,
Identifier subject,
Authenticator auth)
|
void |
challengeSuspectedNode(Handle h)
|
Authenticator |
extractAuthenticator(Identifier id,
long seq,
short entryType,
byte[] entryHash,
byte[] hTopMinusOne,
byte[] signature)
|
PeerReviewCallback<Handle,Identifier> |
getApp()
|
AuthenticatorSerializer |
getAuthenticatorSerializer()
|
Environment |
getEnvironment()
|
long |
getEvidenceSeq()
|
Serializer<Handle> |
getHandleSerializer()
|
int |
getHashSizeInBytes()
|
IdentifierExtractor<Handle,Identifier> |
getIdentifierExtractor()
|
Serializer<Identifier> |
getIdSerializer()
|
int |
getSignatureSizeInBytes()
|
long |
getTime()
Current time in millis, however, we depend on there being a timesource that is more discritized
than the "wall" clock. |
void |
sendEvidenceToWitnesses(Identifier subject,
long timestamp,
Evidence evidence)
|
MessageRequestHandle<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer> |
transmit(Handle dest,
java.nio.ByteBuffer message,
MessageCallback<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer> deliverAckToMe,
java.util.Map<java.lang.String,java.lang.Object> options)
|
RELEVANT_LENGTH
static final java.lang.String RELEVANT_LENGTH
- Option should map to an int < 255 to record the relevant length of the message.
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
DONT_COMMIT
static final java.lang.String DONT_COMMIT
- -> Boolean, tell peer review to not bother committing this message. Don't sign it, log it, expect an ack
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
PEER_REVIEW_PASSTHROUGH
static final byte PEER_REVIEW_PASSTHROUGH
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
PEER_REVIEW_COMMIT
static final byte PEER_REVIEW_COMMIT
- See Also:
- Constant Field Values
extractAuthenticator
Authenticator extractAuthenticator(Identifier id,
long seq,
short entryType,
byte[] entryHash,
byte[] hTopMinusOne,
byte[] signature)
throws java.io.IOException
- Throws:
java.io.IOException
addAuthenticatorIfValid
boolean addAuthenticatorIfValid(AuthenticatorStore<Identifier> store,
Identifier subject,
Authenticator auth)
getEnvironment
Environment getEnvironment()
getAuthenticatorSerializer
AuthenticatorSerializer getAuthenticatorSerializer()
getHandleSerializer
Serializer<Handle> getHandleSerializer()
getIdSerializer
Serializer<Identifier> getIdSerializer()
challengeSuspectedNode
void challengeSuspectedNode(Handle h)
transmit
MessageRequestHandle<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer> transmit(Handle dest,
java.nio.ByteBuffer message,
MessageCallback<Handle,java.nio.ByteBuffer> deliverAckToMe,
java.util.Map<java.lang.String,java.lang.Object> options)
getTime
long getTime()
- Current time in millis, however, we depend on there being a timesource that is more discritized
than the "wall" clock. It is only advanced on a timeout or a message receipt.
- Returns:
getHashSizeInBytes
int getHashSizeInBytes()
getSignatureSizeInBytes
int getSignatureSizeInBytes()
getIdentifierExtractor
IdentifierExtractor<Handle,Identifier> getIdentifierExtractor()
getEvidenceSeq
long getEvidenceSeq()
sendEvidenceToWitnesses
void sendEvidenceToWitnesses(Identifier subject,
long timestamp,
Evidence evidence)
- Parameters:
subject
- the "bad" guytimestamp
- evidence
-
getApp
PeerReviewCallback<Handle,Identifier> getApp()
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